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Explaining the purpose of this paper can be done in a different way. Simplistically put we are trying to explain the trends shown in Figure 1.


Source - Vries, “Connecting Europe and Asia”, pp. 46-49.

This paper deals with the four largest colonial trading nations: Portugal, the Netherlands, England and France. When it comes to tons of cargo exported to Asia, each of these cases has their own interesting trends.​[3]​

The trend for Portuguese exports has five distinct stages.​[4]​ The first stage represents a century of steady Portuguese exports, from 1500 to 1600, operating in the first 80 years with a total monopoly in the region. The most interesting aspect of this period is regularity in the sizes of exports, 42,778 tons was exported between 1501 and 1510; this only had risen to 42,900 tons between 1571 and 1580. The extremes likewise for this period only ranged between 37,030 tons and 55,419 tons. During the second stage there is a brief and rapid up turn in trade in the 20 years from 1601, in which exports shot up to 77,190 tons. This is at a point when the Portuguese had to compete fully against the Dutch, English, French and Danish. The next stage (1621-1670) sees a rapid fall in Portuguese prosperity with exports crashing to a mere 8,635 tons. In the fourth (1671-1760) and fifth stages we see a stabilisation of Portuguese fortunes at two different levels. During the fourth stage exports level out at an average of 12,805 tons, while in the fifth stage the level averages at 8,525.

There are four identifiable periods in the Dutch activities in Asia. In the first period (1591-1640) the Dutch export gradually increase, over taking the Portuguese in the 1620s. The second stage (1641-1700) sees a rapid increase in exports to over the 100,000 tons mark and a levelling off at around 140,000 tons for the subsequent 50 years. The Dutch trade then experienced 30 years of massive growth, with exports levels reaching 289,333 tons in the 1720s. Finally, in the last period 1730 to 1790 we see stagnation in growth and we even see exports dropping in the last decade by 46,916 tons. 

The growth in English trade to Asia happened in three stages. The English entered the Asia trade in 1580 and for three decades operated at a level of only an average of 4,942 tons exported per decade. In the next period (1611-1720) we see a short burst of growth, bringing exports up to 41,681 in the decade of 1610. Apart from minor fluctuations, (a high of 55,055 and a low of 29,161), this level of exports was maintained until 1720. The final stage (1721-1790) is one of unprecedented growth: gradually at first, but in the last 50 years very rapid. This brought the English exports for the first time since 1610 close to overtaking those of the Dutch. In the 1780s exports reached 228,315 tons and estimations for the 1790s are around the 280,000 mark, far above the estimates for Dutch exports. 

The trend in French exports has some similarly to those of the English, especially in their later very rapid growth. Like the English, during the French’s first period of trading (1601-1660), exports were very low usually only reaching 3,000 tons. After an initial rapid burst of growth in 1660s, the second period (1661-1720) was one of slow and steady growth, with exports rising from 12,000 tons to 20,050 tons. The final period (1721-1790) was one of enormous growth in exports; at one point in the 1750s they even overtook the English, though not the Dutch. However, we must note that there was a brief setback to this growth, with total exports in the 1760s actually falling.





The first chapter will look at the organisation of the different trading enterprises, forming a basis of knowledge for our comparison. The formal and information networks of our cases were elaborate and did not always prove applicable to our aims. So we will look at these structures from the view point of a single merchant and the problems he would face trying to organise a trading expedition to Asia on behalf of either the Portuguese crown, the VOC, the EIC or the CDI. For example: Could he directly communicate directly with Asian factories or did communication have to go via other lines? Were there private interest groups with the companies that could hamper or oppose him?

The second chapter will deal with the financial requirements for long distance trade, both at a broad organisational level, for example how much does it cost to run a global trading empire and then at a narrower level, with the costs associated with a single voyage to Asia, which will allow for direct comparisons between cases. Firstly, we will look at the different methods of ship building and choice of ships. Then we will need to investigate the different wage levels, the differences in how many personnel were needed to be employed, the costs of victuals as well as the differing costs of vessels. This all will help us build up a picture of the approximate costs for each nation or trading company and how this could help or hinder trade. 










European colonisers were active all over the world. One of the richest areas was the New World. After Spain’s initial discovery of America, the Spanish moved to secure Central and South America, as well as large parts of North America. Portugal would gain Brazil, while the British, Dutch and French would claim parts of the Caribbean and North America. The Americas provided Europe with a huge supply of precious metals. Several important gold and silver mines were discovered in 1530s and 1540s. An enormous deposit of silver was discovered at Potosi in the Vice royalty of Peru. The amount of silver the Spanish crown was able to extract increased rapidly. In the 1540s 85,000 kg of silver per year was extracted, in the 1570s it rose to 153,000 kg and in the 1580s it peaked at 280,000 kg.​[5]​ In Brazil the Portuguese established an agro-marine economy, almost independent of the local population and as the sixteenth century progressed Portugal turned to importing more and more slaves from Africa. Brazil was characterised by low priced, high volume goods: sugarcane, Brazil wood and other building woods, oil, fruit, salt and in the seventeenth century tobacco.​[6]​ Additionally, Brazilian gold flowed to Portugal in large quantities. It was extremely profitable between 1695 and 1770. In 1703 alone it surpassed all the gold obtained from Mina and Guinea.​[7]​





The next possible location for this study was Africa. The Portuguese established their first bases in Africa in 1482 along the Ghana coast. To start with, the main exported commodities were gold, slaves, ivory and spices. The Portuguese stuck rigidly to the coast line and made no effort to interact with the existing political structures. This was likely due to the lack of necessity and the infectious disease’s of the interior. The European susceptibility to the infections of Africa largely protected it from European colonisation until the nineteenth century’s “scramble for Africa”.​[8]​ Africa could not compete with spices from Asia, yet it did have significant metal deposits, particularly gold. From the 15th to the 19th century Europeans exported mass quantities of gold. In the sixteenth century Portugal exported 700 kg per year, while in eighteenth century the total for all nations exports had been raised to 2,000 kg per year. However, unlike in the America’s, the Europeans had no control over the mining and bought the gold through African middlemen.​[9]​ Gold was not Africa’s only export; sugar plantations were established on the Azores and Madeira Islands. Africa exported: slaves, salt, wine, fresh and dried fruit, oil, cork, shellfish and industrial raw materials to Northern Europe. In return it imported flour, salted fish, diary products, metals, wood, textiles and manufactured goods.​[10]​









There are a numerous possible cases for analysis when one investigates colonisation and colonial trade, examples coming from both state and private enterprises. 

The first unit of analysis is Portugal, one of the first of the European countries to become established outside of Europe. With only a population of 1 million and 89,000 square km, they were smaller than their potential rivals, but they were aided by a long maritime history and a centralised monarchy.​[15]​ The Portuguese started expansion in 1415 with the capture of Ceuta from Islam. This first move had a distinctly religious character and was supported by Pope Martin V who issued a papal bull on the 4th April 1418 appealing to all Christian monarchs to support King John I against the enemies of Christ.​[16]​

By the 1480s Portugal had expanded along the Atlantic coast of Africa and by the early sixteenth century Portugal was active in India. Between 1580 and 1640 the Portuguese lost their monopoly status in Asia when the Dutch and English penetrated into the Indian Ocean. The Portuguese’s situation was further complicated by the relationship between the Crown and private trading. The Cape Route was regarded as a royal monopoly and the Carreira da India was a state enterprise. Additionally, the crown reserved for itself most of the pepper and spice trade. Nevertheless, the crown granted concessions to aristocrats, families, financiers, religious order, officers and crews. This private trade was overseen by the Casa da India who made sure custom duties and taxes were levied.​[17]​ 

As for local political structures, Portugal was content not to dominate existing structures. This can be seen in Portugal’s involvement in Asia. The activities of its royal fleet led to the creation of an active commercial belt from Mozambique to the Malayan archipelago. It established a chain of trading posts, feitorias, along the traditional Asian routes, but it only installed a weak political base at Goa, which was under the authority of a governor appointed by the Lisbon court. The Portuguese employed the same techniques outside Asia, for example in Africa where they just set up trading posts and made no attempt to dominate the more elaborate political entities, such as the Kingdom of Congo, and made no attempt to venture inshore. ​[18]​

The second unit of analysis under investigation is the Dutch Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) which was formed in 1602 by the States General. This corporate form took over from the voorcompagnieen and privateering. The Dutch went on to colonise or control parts of: Indonesia, the Spice Island of Maluku, Dutch Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Formosa (Taiwan), Malacca, Deshima, South Africa, New Netherland (the Americas), Dutch West Indies, Suriname, Guyana, Brazil, Virgin Islands and Tobago. The VOC was at the heart of most of this. It was responsible for ship owning, freighting and building. In 1602 it was granted the monopoly of the East Indies, meaning no Dutch citizen was entitled to commercial activities, between the Cape of Good Hope and the Strait of Magellan. It was founded with a start-up capital of f6,424,588 raised on a long term basis. Decisions about its activities were decided on by the Heren XVII, a board of directors who met twice a year. Their decisions involving construction, equipment and freighting were carried out by chambers in six cities. The most prominent chamber was in Amsterdam, but all six had their own shipyard, fleet and storehouse. This structure was maintained with amazing continuity over the next two centuries.​[19]​

Soon after the Dutch, the English began to play a major role in Asian politics and trade. In Asia they were represented by the English East India Company (EIC). The English colonial adventure started in fairly un-dramatic fashion with Sir Humphery Gilbert in 1583 (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​1583" \o "1583​) claiming Newfoundland for Elizabeth I. Nevertheless, by the early seventeenth century England had many colonies in Northern America, including the Atlantic provinces and had begun colonising the islands of the Carribean, such as Jamaica, Barbados and St Kitts. While at the same time the English East India Company (EIC) received a trade monopoly for the whole of the East Indies. The EIC is the most famous of the chartered companies. It started with a capital of £75,500 and 125 shareholders. At the head of the company was the Governor, underneath him was the Court of Directors, 25 in all appointed by the Court of Proprietors and underneath them were the committees. In the mid seventeenth century the company underwent significant reforms.

The last case that we will be studying is the French company, the Compagnie Des Indes (CDI). It was founded in 1664, over 50 years after the English EIC and Dutch VOC. It had very limited influence prior to 1720, only sending an average of two ships a year around the Cape route to Asia. By the early eighteenth century the situation had changed and the French company was able to maintain a fleet of between 40 to 45 vessels. Also around this time the company changed its policy and started producing it’s owns vessels at its ship yard at Lorient. The company traded in both raw and finished products. Out of raw goods, Bourbon coffee was its dominant product and it’s only widely distributed good. Cargos also included staple products of pepper and tea. The company shipped numerous heavy goods as ballast, typically including dye woods like red wood and cowries.​[20]​ 














Source – Bruijn, J. R., “Productivity, Profitability, and Cost of Private and Corporate Dutch Ship Owning in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries”, in (ed.) Tracy, J.D., The Rise of Merchant Empires in the Early Modern World, 1350-1750, Cambridge (1990) p. 183.
*Not all ships deployed in this region would take part in trade, as a significant number would be needed to establish political or military bases.

The final important coloniser and trader was Spain. Like Portugal they began colonial trading very early and controlled trade through the crown, so they would be a very interesting unit of analysts for comparison with Portugal. They had possessions in the Americas, which covered most of South and Central America, Mexico, parts of the Caribbean and what is now the United States. For the first half of the sixteenth century the crown financed expeditions all over South America. Local and regional governments were staffed by bureaucrats from the Iberian Peninsula and integrated with central government in Madrid. The crown considered it vital that its colonies supported the home economy and did not compete with it. They were organised to produce what Spain did not produce and forced to purchase manufactured and agrarian goods from Spain.​[24]​

The Spanish in the New World had discovered large aboriginal communities within well organised political and economic systems. They made alliances with the native leaders, at the same time as taking by force valuable resources. The Spanish Atlantic trade developed from being ruled by Metropolitan Authorities to small partnerships and “clan” enterprises. Only in the eighteenth century did they develop companies and only to protect monopolies of tropical crops.​[25]​ The trade to the New World was regulated by the Spanish Casa de Contratacion. This self regulating system of trade was set up in 1503 and from Seville it regulated and supervised private trade, ensuring that the crown received its due taxes and tributes.​[26]​ The Spanish technique of using the native elites to enforce their rule had several implications for their political structure. Pierre Chaunu’s words that, “Spain governs, but does not administer” were very apt. Spain only used a handful of royal officials to rule millions of natives. This dramatically reduced bureaucracy and administration costs, but also lead to corruption. The corregidores (magistrates), alcaldes mayores (high magistrates) and governors were really entrepreneurs, whose activities dominated the economy, using their political power to force the native population to meet their demands.​[27]​ Unfortunately, Spain is not eligible as one of the units of analysis for two reasons. Firstly, Spain generally did not operate in Asia and confined itself predominantly to the New World.​[28]​ Secondly, it is unsuitable as a unit of analysis for the very reason it is such an interesting example, its uniqueness. It organisation of its colonies, its political structures and methods of funding are all sharply different from the cases we will look at. A closer look at the Spanish overseas activities shows its similarities with Portugal, as well as the trading companies only goes so far. Portugal’s overseas empire was one of trading posts, merchants and shipping, while Spain’s empire was predominantly land based: centred around taxation and mining. For this reason Portugal’s colonial activities make it a suitable unit for comparison, while the activities of the Spanish crown exclude Spain from the comparison.

Methodology of Comparative Research

-“Explaining macro social units in a systematic way, by looking at the micro level units and their variation.”

For an effective comparison to be made, we must keep to all the best traditions of Comparative History. Previous works have focused on a wide range of topics, but are all united in a commitment to offering historically grounded explanations of large scale and substantially important outcomes.​[29]​ The outcome or macro social unit in this case is European exports to Asia, with the micro level units being the various colonial companies and state run enterprises. This paper will provide evidence demonstrating that this outcome is determined by the success of different funding strategies. It is important to understand that events in history are not static occurrences, which adds to the difficulty of the comparison. This is especially important since this paper deals with a large time span, during which the units under analysis and the environment they operated in evolved and changed. Comparative scholars have yielded important insights in the development and evolution of institutions, such as the ones that will be discussed in this paper; so we must bear in mind processes such as “path dependency” and “feedback mechanisms”.​[30]​ To reduce the impact of this we must take care of the chronology of this period. Additionally, it is important for scholars to have detailed knowledge on each case, enabling them to measure variables in the broader context of each case, increasing the validity of investigations and allowing for “contextualised comparisons”.​[31]​ This is achievable in this study because we have chosen a limited number of cases. A large N investigation means the individual cases disappear from sight and the results tend to only apply to an abstract case. Our chosen “small N” investigation method, as well as avoiding superficial correlations or abstract results, means one can make multiple observations in each case. For example, even though the VOC was responsible for building and equipping its fleet, on occasion it would revert to chartering ships from third parties. Unlike, a purely scientific investigation a historical investigation is not able to stop all outside variables. However, this does not mean attempts to limit variations are useless. Cases need to be sufficiently similar for meaningful comparisons. For example, Spain colonial activities could not be used as a unit of analysis as their activities were focused on the New World not Asia. The different sailing times/condition, exports/imports and local situations meant that numerous uncontrollable variables would be added to the comparison. 

One of the advantages of comparative studies is that they can avoid the typical division of subjects by national or political boundaries, allowing fresh insights into old topics. However, for purpose of this study this is not appropriate. The nationalistic element of colonialism in this period is essential to its character, colonialism being either directly controlled by states or run with royal charters. Company’s interests were always tied to the states. For example, political pressure on the Austrian Emperor by the Dutch and the English forced him to suspend the charter of Ostend Company.​[32]​

The data used in the investigation is both quantitative and qualitative. For this study, the qualitative data will enable us to recreate the structures and the organisations of the companies, such as the VOC and recreate the details of financial markets such as Amsterdam. Whilst, quantitative data on costs of wages, victuals and ship building/freight rates will allow direct and testable comparisons, between each case on the financial requirements of their situations. Though the data on the VOC and EIC is more abundance, the general quality of data is of a high level.

A study of this sort can be criticised. Firstly, by those who seek “universal knowledge”, criticising the limiting of the big questions, for example limiting the application of this study’s results to the period 1500-1800 or not attempting to understand the nature of all funding issues. However, universal theories are often too general to apply to specific cases and operate on a very abstract level, as well as involving many generalisations.​[33]​ Yet, there is a balance that needs to be struck between accuracy to cases and producing a model that can be applied to an unstudied example. Secondly, a general criticism can come from followers of the agency model.  They would believe that comparisons, such as between the different trading companies to learn about colonial funding has no merit, because the uniqueness of each individual historical case and the absence of a general pattern to history. However, like the universal theorists they have pushed their case too far to an extreme.

The final question the reader might be asking, is that why is a comparative method the best approach for investigating the funding of European colonial enterprise. Most importantly by looking at four cases we gain a fuller picture of colonial trade and our findings are better for it. A model can be produced from our results, which theoretically could be applied to other untested cases. Generally instead of “telling a story” as some history does, we will be comparing cases, interpreting results and investigating important issues like funding and costs. For such aims a comparative method offers the required systematic guidelines for accurate results.


Chapter 1 - Organisational Structures and Problems


This chapter will take a more in depth look at the organisational structures of our four cases. However, it is not necessary to detail for each case every single intricacy of their bureaucracies or their elaborate power structures. Instead we will tackle the structures from the point of how it affected trade, positive and negative aspects. This organisational detail will also help us to somewhat fill in the “picture” of European expansion and shipping, helping us to understand why some decisions were taken, even though they may seem illogical at first. We must have a basic understanding of each case’s organisational structure if their funding requirements and options are to be understood. Command structures, interest groups and lines of communications all have determining effects on our trading enterprises. One example of their importance on the costs of trade is the EIC’s policy of hereditary bottom. Through the organisational structure of the EIC an excessively strong shipping interest built up within the company, forcing it to pay over the normal rates for freighting of ships and enforcing the policy of hereditary bottoming so maintaining their monopoly of freighting. 

There is a good body of work on the organisation of different trading company, even though they have never been combined. K.N. Chaudhuri has written the most extensive work on the EIC, the company’s domestic and Asian organisation, as well as general activities.​[34]​ The corresponding work for the VOC comes from K. Glamann, which also has interesting sections on the main cargos of: pepper, spices, silk, piece-goods, sugar, tea and coffee.​[35]​ The two central works for the organisation of Portuguese trade come from J.C. Boyajian and S. Subrahmanyan. Boyajian focuses specifically on the Portuguese in Asia during the Hapsburg period, while Subrahmanyan takes a much larger remit of the entire Portuguese empire from 1500 to 1700.​[36]​ While, G. Daudin’s writing are some of the central pieces for the trade of the CDI.​[37]​





To a certain extent the Portuguese are the odd ones out when it comes to our cases. They were the only state run enterprise, they did not adhere to the joint-stock “ideal” of trade and because of their early entry into Asia they can be considered the forerunners of our other cases. Portugal had witnessed a complicated struggle betweens different sections of its society. Strained relationships were visible between the privileged groups of the monarchy, nobility, merchants, military orders and the church. Additionally, we must consider the rivalry with Spain, as well as the traditional enemy of Islam.​[38]​ These factors meant the Portuguese crown needed to be strong to be able to exert its authority over these groups, leading to a centralising monarchy. This centralising tendency was present in Portuguese trade, with the crown at the very heart of the Portuguese enterprise. 

One of the systems employed by the crown was the system of carreiras (crown trade route). This system was a compromise between crown and private interests. A captain was allowed a proportion of the cargo hold for private use, quintalada, as well as a salary, while the crown supplied the vessel and controlled the greater part of the cargo space. The ports of Pulicat, Melaka and Chittagory were all carreiras. How Portuguese trade worked in Asia changed several times in our period. The clove trade from Moluccas operated as a royal monopoly from 1521 to 1535, but later private merchants were allowed to participate, provided they paid the crown a small sum, a choquel and sold 1/3 of their cargo to the crown at a low fixed rate.​[39]​ With the Hapsburgs in the 1560s this system was reorganised.  By 1586 almost every bit of the Royal monopoly in the cape trade was under a private contract, and private merchants began to assume the financial burden of the Carreira da India, the king was quick to use the monopoly revenues in his continental wars. By 1597 the king had once again turned to direct royal administration of Asian trade.​[40]​ For the first time since 1560 royal officials organised the pepper trade on the king’s account. Though trade directly under the king was not trouble free and the treasury council quickly complained that there was not enough bullion for the purchase of pepper.​[41]​

In 1620 a Christian merchant named Duarte Gomes Solis, published a proposal for a national chartered trading company. Four years later the idea had a strong pro lobbyist group in court. However, Portugal could not attempt to follow the model set by the Dutch VOC, as their situations were too diverse. The Portuguese already had an elaborate local system in place with the “Estado da India” including fortresses which the crown was not prepared to just hand over to private investors. The idea of the company was to transfer the burden of the costs of warfare in Asia to private investors. The company was created, but for the purposes of this paper we will not separate it from the prior Asian trade carried out by the Portuguese crown. The company was not truly a new private enterprise and was still dominated by the crown, which supplied 80% of the investment.​[42]​

Central to the lines of communication and command structure within the Portuguese trade to Asian was the person and power of the king and the importance of the city of Lisbon. This is evident from Illustration 1. One of the defining aspects of the Portuguese trade is the role of the king. The monarch took a serious interest in the Cape Trade and it made up a significant proportion of his income. Yet, the day-to-day running was left to specialised personnel in his household as well as the factor of the Casa da India, who were directly responsible to the king.​[43]​ The king made his presence felt through Regimentos (Royal Orders) which concerned almost every aspect of trade and shipping, from instructions for the crew to the equipping of vessels.​[44]​







Finally, as mentioned in the introduction the Portuguese tried to avoid interfering with local administrative systems. For example in Melaka they tried to make the Sultan return as their vassal, while in Hurmuz they did not establish their own sovereignty, but instead a protectorate, allowing the Shah to remain. Additionally when it came to the Portuguese organisation in Asia, we must remember firstly they were a principally urban presence and secondly institutions such as the Camara Municipal or the Santa Casada Misericordia which could be found all over the empire gave a false sense of uniformity. In reality their institutions were localised, with their success and role dependant on the local states apparatus.​[45]​


Dutch East India Company

Dutch shipping in Asia, as already discussed, was organised through the VOC, no Dutch citizen outside the VOC was entitled to any commercial activities between the Cape of Good Hope and the Strait of Magellan. Though the VOC took part in the same activities as the Portuguese Crown it organised it enterprise in a different way. Firstly, the primary authority of a monarch was replaced by a board of directors. This board of directors, the Heren XVII, met twice a year in spring and autumn.(Even though the VOC shareholders delegated their power to the Heren XVII, they could still have their voices heard even when the charter was not up for renewal, for example as they did in 1723. Nevertheless, this was uncommon.​[46]​ The 17 delegates came from the chambers: 8 from Amsterdam, 4 from Middleburg, 1 from each of the others and a final one either elected from alternate chambers.​[47]​














This effect magnified with the (1647) introduction of ordinaine bewindhebbers, which allowed for more of the landed aristocracy to have a say in the management of the company. In 1650 the organisational structure increased in size with a new committee, the Haagsche Besognes, which dealt with much of the administration, especially dealing with letters and reports from India.​[51]​ 

The company’s organisation in Asia was very different to its organisation in Europe. The VOC Asian HQ was based firmly in Batavia where it strictly controlled the Asian trade.​[52]​ This Asian powerbase was highly centralised and focused around the Board of the Governor General and Councils (GG&R) in Batavia, this was unlike the VOC’s organisation in Europe which was highly decentralised. This system was designed by its first governor-general Jan Pieterson Coen who personally controlled the vast trading system from the Persian Gulf to Japan.​[53]​

One of the important decisions taken by the Heren XVII was to build instead of charter vessels. This choice is an excellent example of the rigidity and conservatism of the VOC’s organisational structure, present in its later years. Near the end of the VOC a popular view emerged that the VOC could be more cost efficient if they chartered their vessels. This view is in Johan Carel Lodewijk Blumes 1791 paper on management, shipping and trade of the VOC. He was an agent and business advisor in India; he compared the VOC and EIC shipping systems. He concluded that the VOC could save millions each year by chartering ships, as opposed to building them.​[54]​ It is impossible now to know for certain whether Blumes assertions were correct, but the very fact this issue was not dealt with earlier by the Heren XVII highlights conservatism that was allowed by the organisational structure to creep into the company.

English East India Company

The EIC chartered two years before the VOC, shared many of its rival’s organisational features. The English version of the Heren XVII was the Court of Directors; it consisted of 24 stockholding members who were elected annually. The court was an independent administration unit for central management. With its subcommittees it controlled decisions relating to raising and management of capital, determination of volume of trade and the introduction of new ideas to the administration of the company. In Asia it had established trading settlements which resembled semi-sovereign states: elaborate court procedures, courts of law, municipal systems and military force.​[55]​ Asia also possessed a lesser decision making body, in the council of Asia.​[56]​






Yet, company servants in Asia generally performed well and we have generally positive comments about them. For example, in 1717 the court wrote to Madras, “We must do you the justice to say you have taken care to make us pretty large returns and have been expeditious in dispatching our ship. We are always pleased to have the opportunity to commend and approve our servants’ management”.​[57]​ 

The Court of Directors established general rules to limit risks and keep costs as low as possible. One of these general rules was that no single ship was to carry cargo of whose value was over £60,000. This was eventually raised to £80,000, but it still meant a distribution of risks.​[58]​ Likewise, EIC vessels were predominantly listed at 499 tons, because at 500 ton vessels were required to carry a surgeon.

The organisational structure of the EIC was comparatively loose in Asia, especially when compared to the Dutch’s centralised approach. This led to a number of problems for English trading, the first being interlopers in the EIC Asian monopoly. The second was trying to control the actions of the captains of vessels, who tended to put into ports just for the sale of their allocated private trade, losing valuable time. For example, Samuel Braund warned Captain Oliver of the Granthan not to abuse his role as captain for personal gain, “the Owner will charge you with the Demorage that they will lose by such Detention, Or if you put into any Port after you are dispatched you shall be answerable for the time lost”.​[59]​ 

After the joint stock charter of 1659 the EIC decided that they would fully revert to hiring ships, only building new ships in India for military purposes. The Directors had never been entirely convinced that direct construction was the most economic option and even in 1607 had invited charters at £30 per ton, though they had no successful responses.​[60]​ Yet, this decision to reply on chartered ships would later prove very problematic. The first associated problem was underutilisation of vessels due to irregular demand, incomplete loading or port delays. Initially chartering ships meant the EIC avoided these costs, but over time ship owners began to transfer these costs to the company through high freight rates. As much as half the fleet could be lying idle at any one point and on outward voyages from England the holds of ships were mostly empty. Port books and Admiralty Court Rolls mentioned the low proportion of time spent at sea compared to time at Port. This under utilisation was not inevitable, as the vessels only required a short period after voyages for minor repairs.​[61]​







When it came to the organisation of a new French company, there were many examples to follow. Firstly, there was the Compagnie du Corail, which traded with the Barbary coast and the Compagnie de la Nouvelle-France, which were two companies created on private initiative. Later in 1604 there was also the Compagnie des Indes Orientale, which was created by the government. Secondly, the French could look abroad to the major players of the EIC and VOC or even to smaller contenders such as the Danish East India Company for a model of their new company.

There are two main distinctive aspects of the structure of French trade in Asia, firstly was the central role of the king and secondly was the instability in its organisation, with constant re-organisation and re-chartering. French Asian trade was first incarnated by Jean-Baptiste Colbert in 1664, the king granted a 50 year monopoly for the trade in the Indian and Pacific Ocean and personally subscribed a substantial amount of the equity. Ultimately, it was not successful and Colbert’s company lost its monopoly in 1682. Next incarnation came in 1719 under the direction of John Law. Laws Company was not solely focused on trade in Asia and was combined with a number of other companies, such as the Compagnie du Mississippi, Indes Orientales, Chine and Afrique; the new Compagnie des Indes would have a monopoly for all French overseas trade. Laws Company was dissolved in 1770. Louis XVI finally reorganised Asian trade with a new company in 1785, with a 7 year monopoly in Asia east of the Cape of Good Hope.


Chapter 2 – Financial Requirements


This chapter will deal with the practicalities of colonial shipping and the possible costs. The whole process is one of extraordinary complexity. The actually voyage required victuals to be acquired, specialised fitted ships to be purchased, built or chartered with different rates for different goods. Purchase of insurance needed to be considered, as did the costs of personnel. Yet, for the Portuguese crown or companies such as the EIC these costs are just the start of expenditures. Agents, cargos, factories, bureaucracy and security issues all contributed to the cost. Therefore, each case needs to be studied in the depth required for their complexity, yet in a way that allows a systematic comparison to take place. To fulfil these two criteria we are taking a two pronged approach. Firstly, we will investigate issues and costs involved throughout the whole process of colonisation for each case. The decision to build or charter vessels, the various ship designs, upkeep of factories, the pay structures of the crews, activities of the shipyards and the organisation/bureaucracy. The unravelling of the process of equipping ships in different countries will allow us to understand what choices traders had to make, as well as what problems might occur. Secondly, we will chart the costs (building costs/freight rate, wages and victuals) for a single trip to Asia by either an East Indiaman or Chinaman. The costs will be converted to a cost per ton basis for the transport of cargo, allowing for direct comparisons between our cases. Furthermore, this section will show the long term development of the actual costs of sending out a single ship. There was a tendency to include cargo costs in equipage expenses, especially in the early accounts of the VOC, however the figures presented below, unless explicitly stated otherwise, are costs calculated excluding cargo.










Cost per ton (£)	39	35.87	37.16	38.98
Source - Chaudhuri, “English East India Company’s Shipping”, pp. 62.

This example shows the stability reached by the EIC in its management of freight costs and the deployment of shipping in the Indian Ocean.​[63]​ This, combined with scarcity of data, means it is correct and necessary not to attempt to distinguish between various destinations when calculating costs. 

The costs between our cases are likely to vary, even for an identical voyage. This is for numerous reasons; different ship designs may have meant a larger or smaller manning requirement, the sailors themselves may have received different pay scales or payment in another form. The preparing of vessels whether chartered, contracted out or self undertaken is an important factor; we will see that some of our cases, for example the VOC, were more successful at controlling building and equipping costs than others. Furthermore, we will also see that some nations “skimped” or “cut corners” on certain costs, such as the EIC’s decision to not employ surgeons on board its vessels.

The quality of historiographical writing on shipping costs is varied both in coverage and depth. Like with all areas of this comparison, the VOC can boast the most extensive body of work. J.P. De Korte’s work De Jaarlijkse Financiele Verantwoording in de Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie is an excellent piece collating and breaking down the VOC’s financial records, for example it allows us to see equipage costs for the VOC as well as the individual chambers.​[64]​ K. Glamann and J.R. Bruijn supply further information breaking down the VOC’s equipage costs.​[65]​ Ingrid Dillo paper adds to this with a comparative study of the system and costs of English and Dutch shipping, highlighting the choices such as chartering vessels.​[66]​ Nevertheless, this paper is too short to get involved in the full intricacies of a comparison, but it is a useful introduction to the subject. The EIC’s costs are simplified by the fact that all shipping costs are compounded into freights. Lists of these freight rates can be found in numerous works, one such being K.N. Chaudhuri’s article in J.R. Bruijn and F.S. Gaastra’s edited book Ships, Sailors and Spices – East India companies and their shipping in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries.​[67]​ This edition has useful papers on Portuguese shipping (1497-1810) and the French company (1725-1770).​[68]​ These papers provide the practicalities of shipping: they identify journey times/routes, ship and fleet sizes, onboard rations, mortality levels, ship construction and the general life onboard. There is a lack of work published in English about the French companies shipping costs, so P. Haudrere’s “The “Compagnie des Indes” and Maritime Matters” becomes the most important reference point. Like the French situation there is somewhat of a gap in literature for Portuguese shipping, however J.C. Boyajian’s book Portuguese Trade in Asia under the Hapsburgs, 1580-1640, provides a detailed overview for a limited period.​[69]​





The Portuguese Crown is perhaps the most difficult case to study, the main reason behind this is the scarcity of data, especially quantitative. Great volumes of evidence was destroyed in the fire that followed the 1755 Lisbon earth quake, but more so because Portuguese activity in Asia dates much earlier and their organisations lacked the type of heavy bureaucracy that one could find in the VOC. Nevertheless, it is still possible for one to recreate an impression of Portuguese shipping and financial requirements. 

When it came to vessels, the Crown had several approaches, building its own ships as well as chartering them from private contractors. It utilised its own personnel to conduct its trade as well as contracting out its monopoly. This is what happened in 1575 when the administration of the trade was contracted out to Konrad Rott, a merchant from Augsburg, and his associates. Another consortium of this sort provides us with valuable information on the costs of preparing a voyage. Phillip II in January 1581 signed a contract with a Lisbon consortium of: Manuel Caldeira, Jacome Barde, Ventura de Frias and Pedro de Noronha. The contract entailed preparing five carracks to sail from Lisbon to Goa and back with the crowns pepper and other cargo. The Casa da India paid the consortium 50,000 cruzados per vessel (138,888 guilders).​[70]​ More evidence is found in 1602 when the king was forced to appeal to the merchant community for voluntary loans to cover the cost of the Carreira da India. The amount required to cover the cost of six carracks to be send to India was estimated at 500,000 cruzados (1,388,889 guilders).​[71]​

The Crown had a number of shipyards. The central shipyards were based at Lisbon, Goa, Oporto, Bassein, Cochin (until 1663) and Brazil. The superiority of Indian teak over European oak or pine meant that Goa quickly became a central point for building. In a Royal order to the Indian viceroy 1585, the King emphasised the importance of building Indiamen in India, “both because of experience has shown that those which are built their last much longer…also because they are cheaper and stronger, and because timber for these carracks is increasingly hard to get here”.​[72]​ Portuguese ship building had a good reputation in the beginning of the sixteenth century and it did not lose this with the loss of its independence in 1586. The shipyards still built enviable ships, such as the 1,200 ton galleon Santa Tereza. Though it was destroyed in the battle of the Downs in 1639 it attracted comparisons to the famous English Sovereign of the Sea and the French La Couronne. While the Spanish prelate Fernandez Domingo Navarrete urged people at Manila to “buy ships of the English or Portuguese of those countries who build [good] ones”. From the same source we find that a Portuguese ship from Goa could be bought in 1665 for 7,000 pieces of eight (21,875 guilders).​[73]​

The ships associated with the Carreira da India were the Naos, which simply meant great ship.​[74]​ This term applied to the carracks of the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.​[75]​ A contemporary description of one of these Naos or East Indian carrack portrays a large merchant vessel, broad in beam; high in poop and forecastle. Even prior to 1647 Portuguese carracks generally had four flush decks, there were some smaller ships, but they tended to be known as noveta.​[76]​ For the early carracks we have very little reliable data, iconography is scare and inaccurate and most of archaeological evidence has been destroyed by time and treasure hunters. Shipwrights were practical men and worked from experience rather than text, likewise scholars were not attracted to the subject. Yet, we can get some idea of the design and more importantly the working of theses ships, by combining all our evidence, such as the virtual reconstruction of a Nau that allows experts to conduct tests such as sailing times or ship performance.​[77]​





Illustration 6. - Portuguese Carracks of a Rocky Coast (1521-1530).
Source- http://nautarch.tamu.edu/ (​http:​/​​/​nautarch.tamu.edu​/​​)





Table 3. - Tonnage of goods carried by Portugal ships around the Cape Route











Source - Vries, “Connecting Europe and Asia”, pp. 46-49.

Generally, manning voyages to Asia was problematic for two reasons. Firstly, it took a long time to train a sailor; secondly there were high levels of disease and mortality rates onboard. Outward voyages of Nau da carreira da India generally had a crew of 120 sailors with additionally 400-500 soldiers. The East Indiamen were required to carry a qualified surgeon and physician, but in practice ships were more likely to have an ignorant barber-surgeon.​[79]​ We have very little specific data of salaries of crews of these vessels, yet we know that they received only nominal rates of pay. Officers in particular had to supplement their income with special privileges, which allowed carrying tax free goods on behalf of themselves or others. The Royal treasury had found itself too exhausted to find sufficient cash to pay crews on a salaried basis.​[80]​

As for the Crowns expenditure on organisation and bureaucracy, it was able to keep a relatively small staff, particularly in Asia. The Asian factories were headed by a Feitor, he would draw his salary directly from the royal treasury and he monitored the sale of the spices as well as other commodities purchased on the king’s account. Under his control he supervised a treasurer, generally three secretaries, numerous weight inspectors, guards, porters and other specialists. The number of these grew substantially in the sixteenth century. The shipyard in Lisbon, Ribeira das Naus and the king’s arsenal, Armazem da India, employed approximately a combined total of 1,500 men at any one point. The king’s servants established similar shipyards and arsenals in Goa equipping ships for the journey home, employing approximately the same amount of men.​[81]​

The height of the Portuguese exports occurred in 1601-1620 with exports for this decade reaching 77,190 tons; this is also in a period in which the costs of shipping were extremely low. It has been estimated that a carrack of 1,600 cost approximately 75,000 cruzados (208,333 guilders) to build, outfit and man for an Indian voyage in 1600. The costs of a galleon were 30% more (per ton), with a 550 ton galleon costing 33,000 cruzados (91,666 guilders). As Portuguese exports declined in the 1620s, the costs rose. The same carrack now cost about 130,000 cruzados (361,111 guilders), the same galleon was now 50% more expensive per ton than the carrack at 74,000 cruzados (205,555 guilders).​[82]​ Even notwithstanding theses increases, the massive Portuguese carracks afforded economies of scale and a reduction in costs per ton, but moreover criticisms of contractors skimping on vital supplies and rigging, ignoring safety and seaworthiness, offer a further explanation of the Portuguese’s ability to keep shipping costs low.​[83]​

Dutch East India Company

The VOC were chronologically the next major player in Asia after Portuguese, and this section will follow the format of the previous one, detailing with the practicalities of shipping and costs. The VOC in the early seventeenth century bought a couple of ships and periodically hired some vessels, especially in time of war. However, in the vast majority of cases it was shipbuilder, ship owner and charter. When founded in 1602, it found no suitable vessels on the market and it chose to build them itself. Costs and values of the ships bought are well recorded in the seventeenth century. In 1735 an east Indiaman of 160 feet would cost £12,500 (138,888 guilders), while in 1790 a smaller East Indiaman was £17,000 (188,888 guilders). This also demonstrates the rising costs and value of vessels.​[84]​

There were exceptions when the VOC was forced to charter ships, the most important example being during the fourth Anglo-Dutch war (1780-95). The war time conditions had made it impossible to sail under a Dutch flag, so the VOC chartered private ships from a neutral nation and sailed under neutral colours. Wartime freight rates however were extremely high and when peace came the VOC were quick to try to return to their tradition system. Yet, because of poor maintenance and loss of ships the VOC were still forced to charter some ships.  Between 1783 and 1789 some 75 voyages were made with chartered ships.​[85]​

When looking at the records of Dutch ships one can easily be forgiven for assuming a great variety and lack of uniformity in the Dutch fleet in terms of ship type. Yet, the long lists of different names are misleading. Like other European companies the VOC used large standard ships similar in appearance to warships, mostly named Retourships. In 1691 the VOC built some fast pinnaces, but only for use in the intra-Asian trade. Unlike its competitors the VOC, also had a considerable number of round stern vessels called fluyts.​[86]​ These were no longer designed to carry armament or gun platforms and were lightly built and with a simple rigging. These excellent small ships were cheap to build, maintain and crew. They proved very cost effective at transporting bulk commodities.​[87]​ The Heren XVII made estimates for both types of vessels for the costs of their perspective voyages. They estimated the cost of the middle size 560 ton east Indiaman, Purmer, to journey to Bengal and return (1682-3) to be 96,433 guilders, so approximately 171 guilders per ton. Likewise, for a similar sized Chinaman to travel to Canton and back (1732-1734), was estimated at 190 guilders per ton.​[88]​


Illustration 7. Division of space and schematic of a 1660 Dutch East Indiaman
Source - http://cf.hum.uva.nl/galle/images/drawings/hullspace_680x250.gif (​http:​/​​/​cf.hum.uva.nl​/​galle​/​images​/​drawings​/​hullspace_680x250.gif​) 


Illustration  8. - The Departure of a Dutch East Indiaman
Source - ttp://www.nmm.ac.uk/mag/pages/mnuExplore/ViewLargeImage.cfm?ID=BHC0784 

Similarly to the Portuguese case, the VOC had difficulty in attracting sufficient sailors, again the reason seem to be the length of voyages, poor pay and high death rates. Captains and senior officers were enlisted directly by the directors of each chamber, but the recruitment of lower personnel was left to volkhoders, which were brokers of sorts. Before 1770, passengers and crew tended to amount to between 180 and 230 individuals. After 1770 this figure rose to around 300-350 passengers, with approximately 200 seamen.​[89]​ The sailors pay was extremely poor and tended be only between 1/2 and 1/3 of wages of a labourer on shore












Source – Bruijn & Gaastra, “Dutch East India Company”, p. 201; Vries, “Connecting Europe and Asia”,  pp. 40; 69.

It is unclear whether the data for the EIC in Table 4 takes into account military personnel, which would add 20-40% to the figures. However, even with this adjustment the numbers on board are way below the VOC, as are the numbers of men on board French ships.​[90]​ Following this line of thinking the subsequent wage bill for the VOC ought to be significantly higher. The VOC also have elevated levels of domestic staff. This was particularly the case in Amsterdam where the VOC was the second largest employer after the Navy. The head office in Amsterdam (Oostindisch Huis) had a staff of 180 dedicated to primarily keeping records and processing personnel and goods, an additional 1,100 were employed at the Oostenbury wharf. In total the VOC is likely to have employed just fewer than 3000 people at its height.​[91]​ The below table and graph highlights the fact that the VOC were maintaining an extensive operation in Asia, which required large amounts of personnel and so were likely to be faced with a large wage bill.


Source - Vries, “Connecting Europe and Asia”, pp. 69-70.





















Source - Woude, First Modern Economy, p. 461.

In contrast to our first case the VOC had an extremely large and costly administration infrastructure, both at home and in Asia. It had every aspect of the shipping system under its control. An excellent example of this style of operation is the purchasing of victuals by various chambers. The company even owning slaughter houses to obtain fresh fish and salted meat. The victuals needed for a nine month voyage with a crew of 350 amounted to: 55,000 pounds of bread, 23,000 pounds of meat, 10,500 pounds of beacon, 4,000 pounds of butter and 700 cheeses, as well as carrying live stock.​[93]​ This type of administration meant the VOC would incur very high bureaucracy and administrative costs.

English East India Company

Like the VOC and for the same reason of dissatisfaction with the ships available for purchase, the EIC in 1607 began ship building at Deptford and other sites. Initially, the EIC followed the Portuguese precedent of large 500 plus ton vessels, but after the wrecking of the 1000 ton ship Trades Increase in 1609 the company standardised its ships between 300 and 500 tons. Whilst trade expanded, this policy of shipbuilding and owning worked well, however when trade was in recession, such as in the 1620’s, the company’s fleet could not be easily diverted to other uses and so was left idle. From 1629 the company began to hire ships and the collapse of trade during the Civil War (1642-51) led to the near ceasing of new constructions. The Blackwell shipyard and part of Deptford were sold in 1654. The new charter and re-organisation that occurred in 1659 cemented the policy of hiring ships as opposed to the EIC being builder and owner. This had the advantage of the company being able to vary the number of ships it sent out and not having to pay for idle ships when trade was poor. However, by the eighteenth century the East Indiamen were rarely transferred to other uses when idle and the costs of this idleness were passed onto the company in high freight rates.​[94]​

All details of ship hire were dealt with in the charter party, which included: freight, impress and demurrage, tonnage allotted to company cargo, treasure and private trade, provision for accommodating company personnel, the schedule, manning, armaments and finally the conditions on which the ship could be kept in the East. Most ships were charted at 499 tons, however they generally had approximately 150 tons surplus. The company paid a variety of freight rates, different according to the destination, cargo and period. The rates for China are noticeably lower. Owners charged lower rates for cargo it considered “gruff” or “gross”, which included sugar, salt petre, pepper and chinaware; “fine” goods were considered to cargo such as spices, tea, silks, calicoes and chintzes.​[95]​

English ship design developed at good rate especially after the conversion to chartered shipping. The sixteenth century saw vessels progressing from one masted ships to three, as well as the vessels being lengthened in relation to its beam, improving speed and manoeuvrability. Later developments such as the coppering or plating of hulls or the constructions of ships in teak were also quickly taken on board.  Until the 1730s the economies of size were relatively small, with larger ships operating at a cost per ton hardly lower than their smaller counterparts. This soon changed and in 1760 the wage and victualing costs of a large ship might only be 2/3 of those of a ship half its size, meaning the risks of under utilisation had to be very high to outweigh such economies. East Indiamen ships comparatively were still heavily manned, yet Table 6. clearly demonstrates the switch to ever increasing tonnage vessels from 1770.​[96]​

Table 6. - Tonnage of goods carried by English ships around the Cape Route












Source - Vries, “Connecting Europe and Asia”, pp. 46-49.


Illustration  9. - Reconstruction of the 1661 rigging of the English East Indiaman Blessing
Source – www. cf.hum.uva.nl


Illustration 10. - A portrait of a powerfully armed seventeenth century East India Company vessel
Source - http://www.portcities.org.uk/london/server/change/storyInPictures/contentType/ConGallery/contentId/69/viewImage/1  


The English shipwrights themselves were generally practical men, working from experience and the rule of thumb, having little time for theoreticians or texts of shipbuilding. This model was summed up by George Waymouth describing the shipping industry in 1610 as working by, “Onely by uncertain traditionall Precepts, and by Deceiving Ayme of theyre Eye”. The shipwrights of London were organised into guilds and trained through apprenticeships. One might surmise that this would only perpetuate traditional and smother innovation, but as already discussed this was not the case.​[97]​

Paying and feeding of crews was the primary costs of sea transport. The Dutch had led the way with small ships which required a minimal crew, such as the previously discussed fluyt. The English had first attempted to imitate this model with captured Dutch ships, however it took till the end of the seventeenth century for English shipbuilders to come up with their own version of a small crewed vessel. The result of this was an increase in the company’s operational efficiency.​[98]​ Vessels such as this were important to the EIC, because like its competitors, at points it suffered from scarcity of sailors. Its policy of chartering ships meant it did not have to directly deal with sailors wages, but in reality wages costs were simply transferred to freight rates charged to the company. This situation was particularly bad when poor diplomatic relations with The Dutch Republic, France and Spain meant the Royal Navy competition for sailors intensified. 

Table 7. Private trade allowance and wage rates		
(for every 100 tons shipping)	1715		1742	










Source - Chaudhuri, “English East India Company’s Shipping”, p. 66.

Similarly to its competitors the sailors on EIC chartered ships received only modest wages, yet this was compensated with private trade allowances. Company agents in England and Asia made sure ships were sufficiently manned before they left dock, they also checked sea worthiness and could insist on repairs at an owner’s expense. Sufficiency made meant 99 men and one boy for a 499 ton ship. The company’s agents mustered a crew before it left and it expected the ship-owner to maintain that level.​[99]​





The CDI followed the opposite path to its English and Dutch counterparts. Upon the CDI’s creation in 1664 colonial trade was already well underway, so it did not have the problem of its predecessors of finding suitable vessels. In the beginning of the eighteenth century it maintained a fleet of between 40-45 vessels, half of which came from foreign shipyards (England, Netherlands and Elbe Estuary). Few of the French shipyards were able to construct vessels for long distance commerce and most tended to be of a low quality. The fleet was very varied in type and age. Yet, in 1730 the CDI changed its policy and built its own shipyard at the Lorient, by 1735 it had completely stopped ordering from other yards.​[101]​

Average cost of construction was 260 livres (217 guilders) a ton or 160,000 (133,333 guilders) for a vessel of 600 tons. There was a big difference between yards. Hamburg was particularly expensive at 327 livres (273 guilders) a ton, St Malo was 274 livres (228 guilders), Nantes 243 livres (203 guilders), Le Havre 240 livres (200 guilders) and finally the Lorient was 261 livres (218 guilders). The prices of shipbuilding in the Lorient fluctuated continually, for example it cost 191 livres (159 guilders) a ton in the 1740s, 248 livres (207guilders) in the 1750s and 286 livres (238 guilders) in the 1760s. However, these fluctuations can generally be explained by the rising price of timber, which on average represented 53% of construction costs. The next largest cost was the requirement for semi-finished products, e.g. nails, metal work and working wood, which accounted for 23.5% of the cost. The final cost was labour costs, which averaged again around 23.5% though the actual cost varied greatly, for example in the 1740s wages amounted to 56 to livres a ton (47 guilders), but in the 1750s this rose to 66 livres (55 guilders) a ton. Finally, it must be noted that unlike previous French shipyards the Lorient made excellent quality vessels and the company was able to run a credible and competitive shipyard.​[102]​


Illustration 11. – Two French ships off the Tasmanian coast in 1792
Source - http://www.leatherwoodonline.com/wild/2006/recherche_bay/  

The CDI fleet required about 5,000 seamen at anyone time, this meant recruiting 1,700 men a year. Obviously these figures fluctuated with military and commercial demands. Recruitment occurred along lines of the system of class and always paid a quarter above the wages on the Kings vessels. The company also retained the right to recruit by mutual agreement. This meant 2/3s of recruits were on the basis of draught and 1/3 on voluntary. The company did not have any serious trouble with recruiting and likewise suffered from only a small percentage of desertions.​[103]​


Section Two – Head to head comparisons for a single ship

Before reviewing the results of the head to head comparisons we must first discuss the data and its reliability. The data from the Portuguese crown is especially problematic. Firstly, the amount of data available is extremely limited. The second problem is the form the data comes in. There is no simple break down of costs into building costs, wages and victuals, but instead we have contract costs for entire voyages and the value of single ships. Accuracy is lost in converting this data into comparable forms.​[104]​ The result of all of this is that our findings for Portugal cannot be taken as an exact reflection of costs of shipping, but rather as just indicating Portugal’s comparative standing. The Dutch situation is completely opposite and we have full records for East India shipping in the eighteenth century and some sporadic data for other centuries. The data situation for the EIC is again favourable. The standard practice from the 1660s of chartering ships means we are provided with a rate that includes all our costs of wages, victuals and freight. Though this does mean we cannot isolate the changing individual components which made the freight rates. Furthermore, after 1700 the new standard charter meant the company would only pay for 404 tons at the set rate, the next 80 tons was to be charged at a much lower rate. The remanding 15 tons was made up with the allowance for officers. Additional cargo was charged at half rate. So the actual rates charged are slightly lower then the flat rates, we will use.​[105]​ The case of the CDI is similar to the Portuguese. The limited availability of data means we have to manipulate it to fit the comparison, thus reducing its usefulness. 

The first aspect of head to head comparisons is building and freighting costs. We have valuations of the cost of individual ships. The Spanish prelate Fernandez Domingo Navarrete wrote that one could buy a Portuguese ship from Goa in 1665 7,000 pieces of eight, the equivalent of f 21,875.​[106]​ This cost is extraordinarily low in comparison to Dutch and English ships. Unless this evidence is completely inaccurate, even when compensating for exaggeration, this source suggests the Portuguese were able to purchase/build much cheaper vessels. An estimate for the construction of a French 600 ton East Indiaman put the costs at 160,000 livres (133,333 guilders) per vessel. The vessels used by the Dutch were expensive, far more than the English or Portuguese. In 1688 their largest east Indiaman cost f98,200 and prices steadily rose. By 1738 the cost had risen to f135,000, while by 1790 it was around f184,000.​[107]​ Building costs incurred by ship owners used by the EIC are recorded by a memorandum of the Committee of Correspondence (1739). The cost of these East Indiaman ships range from f53,333 to f109,333.














Source - Chaudhuri, “English East India Company’s Shipping”, p. 70.
 






(*Portuguese data based on estimations of only one ship)
Sources - Degryse, “Maritime Aspects of the Ostend Trade”, p. 148,, Bruijn, “Productivity, Profitability”, p. 190., Dillo, “Made to Measure?”, pp. 57-66.; Haudrere, “Compagnie des Indes”, pp. 81-97.

The above Figure 3. demonstrates the VOC abilities at cost management. With the exception of the 1780s, where costs rocketed to f141, costs were maintained at a level between f77 and f90. The credit for this is due to the companies servants who kept building costs stable even in the face of rising timber prices. Figure 3. also clearly demonstrates the extent to which the French were unable to match the Dutch efficiency or price stability. If the results for the Portuguese are to be taken at face value, then it indicates that either shipping in the beginning of our period was cheaper or that Portuguese shipping in general was associated with fewer costs.

When it comes to wages of those on board the vessels, unfortunately we only have a complete data set from the VOC. In this case the company servants were not as successful in keeping costs stable, with extremes between f55 and f38. Yet, it is wrong to suggest the fluctuations were wild. As discussed in the previous section the numbers of personnel being sent to Asia by the VOC was far in excess of those sent by the EIC and the CDI so even with no comparable data on wage rates, it is logical to assume that the VOC incurred far greater costs. ​[108]​

Table 9. Wage Costs of the VOC, 1701-1795












Source - Bruijn, “Productivity, Profitability”, p. 190.

Like the VOC, the Portuguese crown would have incurred high wage bills. The average individuals per ship in the 1590s was even to reach 617 persons, furthermore the level of men per ship pre 1700 was in a constant state of flux. 

Source – Bruijn & Gaastra, “Dutch East India Company”, p. 201.; Vries, “Connecting Europe and Asia”, pp. 40;69.
 







Table 10. - Victual Costs of the VOC, 1701-1795












Source - Bruijn, “Productivity, Profitability”, p. 190.






























*estimations based on a 1,600 ton carrack.
Sources - Degryse, “Maritime Aspects of the Ostend Trade”, p. 148,, Bruijn, “Productivity, Profitability”, p. 190., Boyajian, Portuguese Trade, p. 125, Dillo, “Made to Measure?”, pp. 57-66, Davis, “Merchant Shipping”, p. 263.; Chaudhuri, “English East India Company’s Shipping”, p. 75.

These costs are based on expenses from an East Indiamen. As before, assuming the Portuguese data is correct, then Portuguese costs are remarkably low. This could be due to a peculiarity in their method of shipping or simply that shipping costs rose steeply in the sixteenth century. The Portuguese estimations for 1600 are based on the premise, that the most used type of vessel was a 1,600 ton carrack, yet even if the calculations had been carried out with the more a costly vessel, for example a 550 ton galleon, the costs per ton are still low, working out to a mere 166.66 guilders per ton. There is a remarkable jump in costs by the 1620s. This increase is even more prominent if one uses as basis of calculations a Portuguese 550 ton galleon, for which the cost per ton of shipping jumps to an unprecedented 373.73 guilders. However, the most interesting comparison is between the English and the Dutch. Firstly, we must note that the VOC maintain a relative stability in their costs, with only a 108 guilder difference between their highest lowest costs. The range on English freight rates was double, at f226.​[109]​ Secondly, at no simultaneous point were the EIC’s costs lower than the VOC’s, The average costs per ton of a VOC ship in this period was f285, whilst for the same voyage the EIC was being charged an average of f344 per ton. From this we can conclude that even though the Dutch were sending far more personnel to Asia, through efficient cost management they were able to keep expenditure to a minimum, something the EIC was unable to do.

Vessels destined for China share these trends.​[110]​ Compared to East Indiaman the costs are noticeable lower for both VOC and EIC ships. As before, the EIC costs are far more erratic, with a difference of f95 between the highest and lowest. Furthermore, for every decade the average costs of EIC shipping outweigh those of the VOC.















Chapter 3 - Funding Options

Funding long distance trade, like that to Asia, presented merchants in the sixteenth century, with a brand new set of problems. A merchant in London dispatching a ship to India for spices would only expect the cargo to arrive back in London two years later.​[111]​ The merchant would additionally be faced with the capital requirements for purchasing and equipage in Asia as well as maintaining infrastructures there. Trade to Asia was furthermore a risky business pirates, hostile nations and the seas claimed a number a vessels and their cargos. Investing in such risks were even less appealing when one considers the initial unprofitably of the first exploratory voyages. These issues help explain the arrival of the numerous new funding solutions in this period. 

Investment opportunities had to be designed in a way to provide long term capital and reduce or diversify the risks involved. What is important for this paper, as well as for long distance trade in general, is what different funding options were available to each of our cases, what options were chosen, what level of capital investment was the chosen method able to produce and finally how efficient/successful was this method of funding. To this end we will be comparing our cases along a series of points. Firstly, what credit instruments were available? Did they issue bonds or borrow, if so how favourable were the interest rates and how efficient were the capital markets?​[112]​ Was equity used to fund expeditions and to what extent were profits reinvested? Finally, we will be comparing the role of the monarch/government, who was investing and importantly what were the levels of capital being raised. By asking these questions of each our cases we are establishing how much working capital they were able to raise. This is vitally important for trade: working capital determined how large a trading network could be established, for example how much capital was be invested into ship building, product purchase, convoys or local infrastructures. The difference between the financing of the various trading enterprises maybe the key factor in their differing successes in Asia. However, successful financing is not completely dependent on the bottom-line figure of how much investment could be raised, the terms were key and could play to companies’ strengths or weaknesses. For example, selling equity could provide large amounts of capital, but involved the loss of control, whereas loans entail no such loss, but did involve high monetary costs. Other avenues, such as royal financing, also involved certain costs.





For the dominant part of our period the Portuguese trade to Asia was not arranged around a joint-stock chartered trading company, but directly through crown and its royal treasury. This was a traditional approach to financing trade, Elizabeth I of England had financed expeditions in such away, as had Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain. This does mean however, that unlike the other cases there is no equity to speak of. Furthermore, we have been unable to find any evidence of bonds being used a financing tool. This is either because the more traditional structure of funding could not incorporate such a modern credit instrument, an error in the researching of this paper or that the relevant records were not kept. 

Portuguese trade was financed and conducted through the person of the king. This has to be kept in mind as we discuss the core areas of financing: loans were made against his account, all profits passed through his royal coffers before it could be reinvested, it was his sovereign powers that allowed money to be extorted for trading purposes and he was the principle investor. Through these areas we will be able to discover how effectively the king organised the financing of his Asian trade and what level of working capital he was able to create.

The first method of financing we will discuss, that we know the crown did turn to and turned to heavily, is the taking out of sizeable loans.​[118]​ According to L. Neal we can see across Europe a split when it came to capital markets and credit instruments, a split between Protestant and Catholic countries.​[119]​ This may explain some of the differences in funding between our cases, Portugal and France being catholic, while England and the Netherlands being protestant. In protestant Europe, markets for debt instruments issued by nobles, cities or guilds could determine the process at which they were bought, even if the interest rate on par value of these securities was limited by a usury law. In catholic Europe, where Portugal was placed, practices were more constrained. Interest rates were fixed on both short and long term loans, by the usury law. To some extent interest could be varied by the lender to reflect the risk they were taking on, but again only within the limits of the usury law. Before the emergence of a secondary market there was a serious problem with liquidity. However, this is less applicable to our case as the larger or better known the borrower, the less binding the liquidity constraints for lenders, so the crown along with city corporations and noble houses could borrow larger amounts and at better terms.​[120]​ The church ban on usury affected the Portuguese more than the Dutch, English and French, because of their earlier entry into the Asian trade and their Catholic religion. Usury had always been criticised by the church, “If someone takes usury, he commits violent robbery”, but pressure from the church increased substantially in the thirteenth and fourteenth century, the 1311 Council of Venice even decreed excommunication for who allowed usury to be paid.​[121]​ Usury could be circumvented, but it meant an increase in transaction costs.

The Portuguese planned their Asian trade on a year by year basis, lacking a longer term strategy. Being able to raise sufficient capital so send ships to Asia depended a lot on the success of the previous year’s voyage and that no unforeseen costs or problems would arise. However, unforeseen circumstances and misplanning occurred frequently, and one method for dealing with this short fall in capital, was loans as described above. The extent of borrowing becomes apparent if we just track the years after the turn of the seventeenth century. In 1601, the king’s use of revenues left him with just 250,000 cruzados (694,444 guilders) to finance the carreira, which included buying cargo, equipping ships and hiring personnel. The king was forced to appeal for voluntary loans. The next year the king faced the same capital shortage and forced private merchants and the municipal corporations of Lisbon and Oporto to complete the preparations for the carreira. In 1603 the royal officials had to bully Lisbon merchants into providing 800,000 cruzados (2,222,222 guilders) for the purchase of cargoes. In 1604 and 1605 the crown appealed heavily to the New Christian communities to bail out the Asian trade. Heitor Mendes de Brito loaned 15,000 cruzados (41,666 guilders), while Manuel Gromes d’Elvus lent 12,000 (33,333 guilders) cruzados. In these two years the New Christian communities lent over 200,000 cruzados (555,555 guilders).​[122]​ A particular advantage of this method of funding, which is specific to the Portuguese case, is the ability of the king to force individuals to lend money and at favourable rates. 

One of the main sources of capital for any long distance trading enterprise is the use of retained profits. This was the Portuguese’s model of trades greatest weakness, the king (the principal investor) took the profits out of the Asia trade and diverted then to European matters as quickly as possible. There was no separation in funds for the carreira and normal business, revenues from spices were deposited in a common royal treasury, confused with taxes and other revenues. Revenues were spent on unrelated dynastic, diplomatic and military projects. An example of this behaviour comes from the reign of Phillip II who diverted pepper revenues into the armadas of 1588 and 1590, with the weak justification that these military expeditions were against the Dutch and English who both posed a threat to the Portuguese overseas empire.  This short sighted behaviour ensured the Portuguese were never able to build up the kind of infrastructure in Asia, which could be boasted by the Dutch. Furthermore, it meant with no permanent base of capital the survival of the carreira could easily be endangered by unexpected problems. For example, when four out fives carreira vessels in 1604 were lost at sea, the carreira  was thrown into temporary chaos.​[123]​

The Portuguese enterprise had an extra weapon in its funding arsenal: the crowns powers to extract capital from individuals forcefully or by circumventing normal practices. This could be seen as just desperate acts to save a capital starved enterprise, however we must not dismiss it as such, as did provide a substantial amount of capital. In 1597 Royal councillors suggested that the viceroy in Goa seize the money of the deceased deposited in the misericordia. In particular they recommended the seizure of 51,000 cruzados (141,666 guilders) belonging to the late Manuel Fernandes of Hormuz. These funds were then used to prepare three carracks to ship pepper and diamonds to Europe. Activities such as this were commonly undertaken by the Portuguese crown. However, the crowns greatest abuses were against the New Christian communities. Phillip II turned to the communities of New Christians in the Iberian Peninsular, Asia and America on an unprecedented scale, using numerous pretences to extort money from them. The most dramatic example came after the Pope and Roma Cura in 1604 granted a pardon to New Christians, giving some protection from the harassment and threats of the Inquisition. However, the Hapsburg monarchy only allowed it to be published in their territories after the payment of 1,700,000 cruzados (4,722,222 guilders), a huge sum. Some of which went towards trade in Asia.​[124]​

As has been made clear so far, the main investor in the Portuguese enterprise was the person of the king, with at his disposal the machinery of government (e.g. the taxation system). However, the king was struggling to afford the costs of maintaining his Asian empire, especially with the associated security costs. So the decision was made to transfer some of these costs to private investors, therefore the government proposed a state sponsored India Company. Through this prospective investors in Portuguese trade become visible. New Christians again featured prominently, with a new pardon and loosening of restrictions in 1627, New Christians even sat on the board of directors.​[125]​









Source - Subrahmanyan, Portuguese Empire, London (1993) p. 162.

As is evident form the above table, after crown investment, the only significant investment came from municipalities.​[126]​ Again we must state that since 80% of this enterprise’s investment came from the crown it should not be considered separate from the previous and subsequent crown trade to Asia. 

Our final aspect of comparison is Portugal’s total trading capital. This allows us to see how successfully Portugal managed to use its available sources of funding and how much capital they were able to raise, which would eventually decide how many ships they could send to Asia and how much infrastructure they could construct both in Europe and Asia to aid their trade. We only have data on capital resources near the end of the sixteenth and early seventeenth century, this is a period when Portugal’s exports to Asia were at their height. The Dutch governor-general Jan Pieterson Coen in 1619 estimated that Iberian trading capital in Asia was roughly 1.8 million cruzados (5 million guilders) this exceeds capital estimations for all of our cases in this period. It was possible that Coen overestimated Portuguese capital in Asia to prompt for the VOC to send himself more funds, yet a figure this high is not without precedent. The Portuguese Antonio Bacarro was informed and prominent in India, he estimated investment in trade in Indian ports to be about 2.8 million cruzados (7.8 million guilders).​[127]​ Finally, James Boyajian has attempted to calculate Portuguese capital invested in Asia, by combining investments for all individual ports and trade routes. The first section is calculated from the Estado’s customs and second from the other routes. He calculates a total capital of 4.37 million cruzados (12.1 million guilders), an investment far superior to that of any other nations in this period.​[128]​

Table 14. - Estimated Portuguese Investments in Asian Trading, 1580-1598 (thousands)
Port or Route	Value (cruzados)	Value (guilders)








Net value of trade	7,636	21,211
Capital invested in trade (50%)	3,818	10,605
Estimated Portuguese share (70%)	2,673	7,425
		












Capital invested in voyages (50%)	1,701	4,725
		
Total Trading Capital	4,374	12,150
Source -Boyajian, Portuguese Trade, p. 55. 

Our assessment of the funding of Portuguese trade is certainly not as gloomy as one might expect. A combination of high profits and generous crown investment, proved an excellent alternative to equity sales, with high investments prior to 1620. Nevertheless, the failure of the Crown to increase funding to compete with new European rivals and to generally increase the size of operations, meant trade suffered, confidence was damaged and investment stagnated. The loss of confidence is reflected in the mediocre investments in the “Portuguese Trading Company” (Table 13.)

Dutch East India Company

Historians have paid great deal of attention to how VOC funded its enterprises both because of their originality, but also because of their apparent success, which allowed the VOC to dominate Asia for almost 200 years. The VOC had a wide range of options and took advantage of many of them, issuing bonds or resorting to credit, but as we shall see the core of their finances was based upon permanent capital from equity and the reinvestment of profits.

The first of the possible funding methods was through bonds. By the sixteenth century bonds were likely to be a common credit instrument for Dutch merchants, offering a sound and flexible funding option.​[129]​ There is evidence that they formed a small part of the VOC’s funding strategy and that they were used to raise capital for expansion. As was done in 1672 and later in 1696 when bonds were sold to investors. 8.9 million guilders was raised with non-redeemable bonds at rates of 3.5% and 4%.​[130]​ The more interesting, as well as the most defining, part of the VOC’s fund strategy was the equity options. The VOC was a joint-stock company, this meant a total of 1,800 individuals contributed to its initial capital, with less than 200 investors accounting for half of this. These individuals were the shareholders. The charter distinguished between two types: participaten and bewindhebbers, active and inactive members. The bewindhebbers who numbered only 76 possessed the sole authority in the company and from them the seventeen directors were elected. However, both types of shareholder only had limited liability. Due to the enormous amount of money involved the participatens and bewindhebbers were only liable for debt up to the amount they invested.​[131]​ The initial issuing of shares created a capital base of f6,424,588, returns were not to be issued until after 10 years. However, after this it was decided that the capital was to be made permanent.

In the early years the system of equity and the payment of dividends worked to create maximum capital, whilst paying the minimum of dividends. To increase investors buying capability, shares could be paid for in instalments, with official calls in 1603 (25%), 1604 (33.3%), 1605 (33.3%) and 1607 (8.3%). This system of spacing meant that investment was continuously being received in the VOC’s early years. Amsterdam’s stock capital alone made up 3.6 million guilders of the 6.4 million total.​[132]​ This system nevertheless, did have disadvantages as well. It would be now the board of directors, rather than the shareholders who were faced with temporary cash shortages. The share payments were arranged to be in time with VOC expeditions. However, money was needed earlier to provide for outfitting and rigging of ships. The Heren XVII were forced to offer shareholders 8% interest on capital given before payment calls. Gelderblom and Jonker believe the company with this method was able to raise in the region of 375,000 to 750,000 guilders. Nonetheless, the VOC still had to revert to borrowing on the Amsterdam market and as early as 1603, furthermore between 1604 and 1605 the company borrowed 500,000 guilders from various merchants, widows and welfare institutions.​[133]​

When it came to borrowing the VOC had access to Amsterdam, an extremely efficient capital market. Capital markets were important because savers and borrowers wanted different things, savers on the one hand wanted liquidity (the ability to convert their capital back into cash at a low transaction cost) while borrowers wanted investment for a locked in period of time, markets like Amsterdam had developed to overcome these problems.​[134]​ When dealing with capital markets, there are two important points. Firstly, how much capital they could provide and secondly at what interest rate. We will start with this second point. There was rapidly growing demand for capital in Amsterdam, yet this competition seems to have only increased supply. This increase in supply is then reflected in the lowering price of credit. The Amsterdam money market also benefited through immigration, with the Amsterdam merchant community increasing in size from 500 to 1,500 (1585-1670). The immigration of Antwerp merchants alone is likely to have increased the cities capital stock by 50%. The VOC itself added to this process. Its shares were used as collateral on short term loans and so lowered information and enforcement costs. The secondary market that was created meant funds were mobilised that otherwise would have lain idle.​[135]​ This all meant Amsterdam could boast extremely competitive interest rates. These were interest rates that the VOC took advantage of, for example in 1614 the VOC acquired funds from the Amsterdam Lending Bank at an interest rate of only 6.25% and again in 1619 they borrowed from the Bank of Amsterdam at similarly good rates.​[136]​ Dutch lending power was so strong that they can be seen as a strong force behind many of the European trading company’s, for example the French, Danish and Ostend company. 








Source - Woude, First Modern Economy, pp. 390-391.

The VOC did not ignore the option for cheap credit and between 1613 and 1620 they borrowed 5.6 million guilders to finance equipages that exceeded the revenues generated by the sale of returning goods. As demonstrated by Table 15. the VOC continued to borrow substantial amounts.​[137]​

A one off, but substantial source of capital for the VOC came from a unusual place, out of the price war it had with the EIC. The VOC accumulated enormous amounts of pepper and other spices in its European warehouses, it had almost accumulated to the value of 14.6 million guilders by 1682. After this it was able to reduce its shipments to Europe, freeing up capital for other uses. The extra capital was no trivial sum, by 1699 the book value of spices had fallen to just 3.5 million. This policy had raised 10.45 million guilders.​[138]​ We should not attribute too much credit to the VOC for this policy, as it resulted more out of circumstances than forward planning and furthermore profits were dependent on price of spices at purchase and price of sale. Nevertheless, it provided a substantial short term cash influx that the VOC would have heartedly welcomed.

The main source of capital for the VOC came from the reinvestment of its own profits. This subordination of shareholders allowed the VOC working capital to rise to over 20 million guilders in the 1660s.​[139]​ The Heren XVII and the company’s organisational structure worked in harmony resisting calls for dividends. In its early years the VOC benefited from very high pepper prices in Europe, and they ploughed all the profit back into the expansion of its fleet and into the sending of trading capital to Asia. By 1610 the shareholders still had not received a penny, while the company had increased its trading capital by 40%. The directors continued to argue that they needed to reinvest to secure their position against the Portuguese and English. When the first dividend came in 1610 it was distributed in the form of pepper and mace, rather than cash. The company said it amount to a 125% dividend, but many shareholders complained that they could not realise this return.​[140]​ The reinvestment of profits was such as good source of capital for the VOC not only because the high level of reinvestment, but also because of the very high profits being produced. These high profits were true of all early expeditions to Asia, between 1598 and 1608 Amsterdam companies yielded annual returns of 27.4%, the equivalent of 8 million guilders.​[141]​

Who was providing this investment is our next question. Traditionally, directors sold shares to family members, friends and business relations. However, with the charter of 1602 this all changed. Directors no longer operated as underwriters canvassing buyers, a financial market had developed. A closer study of Amsterdam shows that investments raised through personal connections now only accounted for 29%.​[142]​ Initiatives widened investment out from the principle port of Amsterdam. The circle of investment was also widened to include non-merchants who provided 30% of the new capital stock.​[143]​

If we look at the success of all these funding methods in combination, we see that the VOC was able to create an extremely healthy trading and investing capital. Whereas, between 1601 and 1611 the EIC received an estimated investment of 4 million guilders, the Dutch company received a total more around the figure of 12 million. By 1630 the capital accumulated by the Dutch investors in the Asian trade was 25 million guilders; this was five times the amount of their English counterparts.​[144]​ This capital was used to create a strong base in Asia, between 1613 and 1630 the annual shipments of specie to Asia rose to a level of double of what it was prior.​[145]​

Table 16. - VOC Investments and Returns in the Cape Trade, 1613-1640 (guilders)






Source - Boyajian, Portuguese Trade, p. 113.

Table 16. shows the massive amount of capital that was invested by the company, but it also shows that by the 1630s the investment in Asia was paying off and the capital returning was substantially higher than the capital being sent.

As to be expected the VOC had an excellent trade record with funding. They were able to raise substantial amounts of capital and invested in long term development. Even notwithstanding the high levels of reinvestment of profits, financial markets in Amsterdam offered a wide variety of short term and long term credit, at low interest rates. The English diplomat William Temple perhaps best summed it up in 1673 with his observations on the company, “Low interest…the use of their banks…the severity of justice…the convoys of merchant fleets…the lowness of their customs…order and exactness in managing their trade…the vastness of the Stock that has been turn’d wholly to that [East Indian] trade”.​[146]​ With such attributes we should not be surprised at the VOC’s success in Asia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

English East India Company

Before the creation of joint-stock, companies in England faced serious funding problems. 1586 saw the Russian company liquidated and re-established to attract new investment, 6 years later the Levant company had to merge with the Venice company to boost investment. When it came to the Asian trade, these problems became more acute. Military protection was needed, as was the building up of trading posts, yet the early English merchants failed to invest in more than one voyage at a time.​[147]​ The newly chartered EIC solved many of these problems, as well as having in common many of the funding options as the highly successful Dutch company. Vitally important is the change to a permanent capital stock base and the mid seventeenth century reforms which modernised the company. This strong capital base was supplied by a large number of predominately London merchants, this base was added to with reinvestment of profits, but not on the same scale as the VOC reinvestments. Finally, in this section we will discuss the remaining avenues of financings: those of loans, bonds and securities.

Before going into the EIC’s funding options it must be mentioned that in this period England was under went a financial revolution, and while it did not directly affect the EIC, the general financial health of the country certainly did. William III, Stateholder of the Netherlands, ascended to the throne of England and Wales in the Glorious revolution of 1688. William imported a range of very important financial innovations, ranging from the issuing governments bonds to the introduction of a national bank.​[148]​ These reforms soon began to payoff. 

The EIC underwent a real evolution from the primitive practices of terminal capital in the seventeenth century to something more like modern financing in the two decades following the renewal of its charter. In 1600 capital was invested just one voyage to the next, the venture had to be completely wound up and profits received before merchants thought about reinvesting their gains. From 1660 this changed, the EIC adopted a policy under which paid-up share subscriptions and fixed assets of the company were locked in as the permanent trading capital, not so liable to periodical withdrawal. Regular dividends were paid from retained profits and were in no sense repayments of the original capital.​[149]​ The new charter was established in 1657 with a nominal capital of £739,782 (8,219,800 guilders). Adverts for subscriptions appeared in the October of that year, payable in six cells, with the final date for payment being March 1660. Unfortunately, in this period London was experiencing a low and there was a general lack in confidence, so the Court of Committees only decided to call up £369,891 (4,109,900 guilders) (50%) of the capital. This permanent capital served as the financial base of the company, yet it is important to note that it only amount to between 33-50% of the company’s annual turnover.​[150]​ It is also important to note the general good health of the London stock market by the very end of the seventeenth century. The activity of the stock market helped transparency and from 1698 all the major options of the stock market were being published twice weekly. Furthermore, the large stock of government bonds was an ideal liquid asset.​[151]​

One available funding option was the issuing of bonds and securities. By the 1690s an active market for bonds had emerged in London, one which was closely based on the Amsterdam model. Bonds became a significant part in the EIC’s funding strategy.​[152]​ The company offered the public two types of investment. The first was to become a shareholder and share in the uncertainties of trade, the yield being measured by the ratio of dividend declarations to the share price. Alternatively, one could invest in the companies fixed interest bonds. This in the eighteenth century became one of the main outlets for the temporary cash of city merchants. They were transferable and redeemable every six months and had the option of renewal. These bonds had the additional advantage of significantly increasing the commercial liquidity of the London community.

The next option available to the EIC was to borrow. England generally had a reputation for easy and flexible credit. The partner of the Amsterdam house of Hope & co. (1784), wrote of the British flexibility in credit, “They are of all nations the least difficult to treat with, and the most adverse, through motives of personal interest, from distressing their neighbours; thence partly their unbound trust to one another.”​[153]​ England had developed by the sixteenth century a wide variety of financial intermediaries and credit instruments. The traditional goldsmiths, scriveners and attorneys, were added to by country and in the seventeenth century merchant banks as the suppliers of credit in England. Merchant banks in particular were very important in financing trade and were unique to Britain, nevertheless the trade they were concerned with was intra-European. The EIC like most companies needed to borrow money to counter act cash flow problems, luckily London was an excellent money market. An efficient money market was one in which all information currently available to participants on both supply and demand sides of the market is reflected in the current price, as well as being available to potential participants. These were characteristics which London possessed. The act of bankruptcy was passed in 1706, which meant a dissatisfied creditor could petition the Lord Chancellor to begin bankruptcy proceedings against an individual or corporation. The law helped felicitate the expansion of trade credit in Britain.​[154]​ However, the EIC did not only borrow in London, it had to resort to heavily borrowing in India, to tie over any shortfall from one season to another. For example, in 1664 the Madras Council was given permission to borrow up to £10,000 (111,111 guilders) from Indian bankers. Similarly, evidence from 1674 suggests that factories in Bengal were regularly asked to find local finance, occasionally even using Dutch agents.​[155]​

Calculating the amount of investment with retained earning in the EIC relies on knowledge of English profits. However, this is a difficult and uncertain exercise. There were few uniform standards against which risks and returns of particular ventures could be measured and merchants failed to keep their accounts in a form which allowed easy and quick estimations of profits.​[156]​ We do know that that prior to the re-charter in 1657, the EIC was struggling to break even. It took 15 years for the EIC to fund the Asian trade just from retained earnings. Furthermore, up to 1650 the capital from retain earnings reinvested after dividend payments never exceeded £90,000 (1 million guilders).​[157]​

The investors in the EIC were considerably different to their immediate predecessors who invested in sixteenth century long distance trade. Prior to the EIC investors were mostly personally involved in overseas trade, and all were aware of the risks of long distance trade, especially in a period where maritime insurance was still in its infancy. This meant they all wanted some say over the particular enterprise. Business corporations limited their memberships, with relatively high membership fees. This meant the investors tended to be a small group of experienced merchants.​[158]​ The investors in the EIC were a larger and more diverse group, though still primarily a body of London merchants. The number of transactions in EIC ledgers outside London is astonishing small. Yet, the stock they held was only in small segments and the actual amount held by the directors was again very slight. Estimation’s of their holdings between 1783 and 1793 gives a maximum figure of £176,000 (1,955,556 guilders) or about 3% of stock. Out of the 13 men who served as chairman or deputy chairman in this period none owned more that £36,000 (400,000 guilders) of stock.​[159]​ 

In opposition to this tight knit group of London merchants, was another small group of clergy and ordinary men. Yet, they never had held shares in significant quantities to challenge the London shipping and banking interest. The next investing group within the EIC was the foreign contingent. When studying the EIC ledgers for 1783-1791 what is interesting is the large number of Dutch names. They came from primarily the Portuguese-Jewish community of Amsterdam or were representatives of the great noble houses. Near the end of the eighteenth century their stock increased rapidly. For example, in 1791 the Portuguese-Jewish community owned £250,000 (2,777,778 guilders) and the great noble houses had £550,000 (6,111,111 guilders), while in 1783 the figures were only £165,000 (1,833,333 guilders) and £500,000 (5,555,556 guilders). In total 1/5 of EIC stock was in foreign hands, with majority of these investors being Dutch.​[160]​

The EIC’s total working capital is more difficult to calculate than the previous two cases. We do know that from 1601 to 1611 English merchants only invested 4 million guilders.​[161]​ The re-charter in 1657 increased investment and meant they operated with a nominal capital of £739,782 (8,219,800 guilders). Nominal capital was then increased by subscription to £4,000,000 (44,444,444 guilders) in 1786, then to £5,000,000 (55,555,556 guilders) in 1789 and finally, to £6,000,000 (66,666,667 guilders) in 1793.​[162]​





The funding of the French company in all its rapidly changing incarnations and the turbulent Paris market is very much a convoluted issue. One constant however which is mentioned in the records, was the capital shortages, especially in Asia. Georges Roques an experienced merchant and employee of the French company in Bengal writing in the end of the seventeenth century wrote that the company was forced because of a severe lack of capital to integrate itself with the local existing systems.​[164]​ Like the Portuguese case, the king was at the centre of financing. Although the CDI did have access to credit, the main source of finance, as will be discussed, was through the selling of equity. The French company did not occur naturally through the actions of the mercantile class, but was rather forced into creation from top down, the effects of this will become apparent in the discussion.

When we look at who financed the CDI we come to some interesting conclusions. Traditionally in French shipping, the capital required was found by directly appealing to those who were interested in its success, so the ship owners, traders, captains or personal contacts. This meant a large part of long distance trade as financed from port hinterlands, this is in contrast to say England where the banks were able to make advances. French merchants were not able to attract capital from outside their own mercantile world. So the subsequent profits for their ventures were then divided amongst this small group of investors, the “trading elite”.​[165]​ However, this class never fully embraced the new French companies, such as the CDI, preferring safer investments. The crown was forced to directly interfere, pressuring royal officers, courtiers and Paris financiers, who not only felt it was their duty to support the king’s initiatives, but also were dependent on royal patronage.  Cardinal Richelieu had been faced with a similar problem of trying to persuade the mercantile class to invest in a state run project, unsuccessfully, and in the 1627 Assembly of Notables he openly praised the Dutch for their ability to pool resources.​[166]​

The crown was at the heart of investment as well as at the heart of the company. Unfortunately, enthusiasm could not be created among the bourgeoisie or trading elite. Schemes to stimulate private investment in the company, like the one spearheaded by Francois Charpentier were largely unsuccessful. Out of the 5.4 million livres (4.5 million guilders) subscribed in the summer of 1667, 2 million (1.6 million guilders) came from the crown. The remainder of the “private investors” were predominantly courtiers, members of the royal family and nobles. So unlike the English and Dutch company’s, which were based upon solid support from the rising capitalist class, the French company was dependent on the Controller-Generals ability to arrange investment and support from the crown and aristocracy.​[167]​ It can almost be said the crown acted like an understanding and overprotective mother towards the CDI. It did not expect its initial investment to be repaid, in 1670 it allowed the free loan of royal vessels and it is almost certain that the very large and expensive first fleets of the CDI would have ruined the company had it not been for the patronage of the king. Though, after the disastrous Asian fleet of 1672-4, a lot of this support melted away.​[168]​

The CDI was a joint stock company so we could expect that it would receive the majority of its initial funding through the selling of equity. Jean-Baptiste Colbert founded the company in 1664 with a projected pool of capital of 15 million livres (12.5 million guilders). This capital was divided into shares of 1000 livres (833 guilders). Investors were offered some security by the fact the king bought 3 million livres (2.5 million guilders) of shares, against which the losses of the first 10 years could be offset.​[169]​ The next incarnation of the CDI was under John Law in 1719. The French were again able to raise significant capital via the selling of equity. To finance 25 new 500 ton ships Law issued 50,000 new shares with a nominal value of 500 livres (417 guilders) each, creating a total additional capital of 25 million livres (21 million guilders). Placing considerably more capital at the company’s disposal than it had previously. A second and third issuing of shares was made, and before the share price eventually collapsed it had risen to over 4000% of par value.​[170]​ The CDI survived Laws downfall, after a reorganisation in 1722 it was able to raise finance through the issuing of new equity and bonds. The CDI received its next facelift by Louis XVI in 1785, this new company again used equity as the basis of its permanent capital, issuing 40,000 shares of a value of 1000 livres (833 guilders).

When it came to funding through credit, the CDI was at a disadvantage. Whereas England and the Netherlands had modern and efficient money markets, France according to Neal was over reliant on financiers and credit institutions, which was stunting the development of markets.​[171]​ He continues that the actions of the paternalistic government protecting finances and financial institutions from market fluctuations did not help. Financial power rested in the hand of a small, but diverse group if financiers.​[172]​ Nevertheless, France did have the money market of Paris. Paris was far richer than the rest of France and was home to numerous investors: nobles, office holder’s civil servants, merchants and industrialists all had savings to invest. Paris’s formal institutions of credit may have changed frequently, but there were five distinct groups: merchants, financers, notaries, private bankers and corporate banks. The French financial system was still influenced by usury laws, to a greater extent than countries such as England, where it was less binding.​[173]​ The maximum level of interest was fixed at 5% in 1665. In Paris around 1750 the legal rate had imposed itself and in rural interest rates were converging towards the 5% mark.​[174]​ Short term commercial rates varied much more, yet the price between 1740 and 1790 was 4.99% per annum, which was comparable to London.​[175]​ With such strict control over interest rates one might expect that credit in Paris would have to be rationed, but this does not seem to have been the case, especially by the end of the eighteenth century. The long term credit market was able to create enough new debt instruments to offset the negative consequence of interest rate regulation.​[176]​

Finally, when we are discussing the market, which the CDI had to turn to for finance, it must be noted that continuity and stability were in very short supply. The government experiment with introducing a paper currency, a national debt and the Banque Royal was established to mimic the Bank of England. In eighteenth century alone France had 46 different Controller-General of Finances. Not an ideal environment for the CDI.

We do not have clear or simple records regarding the CDI’s total trading capital. We do know that it was on several occasions able to raise large amount of capital through the selling of equity: 15 million livres (12.5 million guilders) in 1664, 25 million (20.8 million guilders) in 1719 and 40 million (33 million guilders) in 1785. Finally, in February 1770 the company had to transfer all its assets, rights and properties to the state and so had to undergo a valuation. This valuation estimated the company to be worth 30 million livres (25 million guilders).







In the sixteenth century a selection of nations, burst out of Europe and into the global scene, they traded, colonised and dominated. We are left wondering how. This paper looks at only a small part of this huge process, how certain European nations were able to trade with Asia, more specifically how they could afford to do so. In this paper we have been striving to find out what role did funding play, what composed a successful funding policy and was a nation’s funding strategy linked to their success, whilst keeping in mind the differing financial requirements faced by each nation. By posing these questions to each of our cases and producing comparable and quantitative results, this paper hopes to highlight funding as the key reason for the success of European trade to Asia. 

The first chapter of this paper dealt with organisational structures of the four trading enterprises, showing how they were structured around joint-stock or a monarch. The structure of Portuguese trade changed several times during this period, trade operated through royal monopolies (carreiras) or sections were contracted out to private merchants, yet at its centre remained the person of the king. The Asian trade was a royal privilege and an important part of the monarch’s revenue. Unlike its fellow early traders the Spanish and its later rivals the English, the Portuguese did not try to dominate local political structures, but instead preferred to operate along side or on the periphery of them. This decision was not necessarily for reasons of humanitarianism or efficiency, but more likely that they lacked the required resources to do so. The organisation of the VOC was very different. Firstly, the Dutch in Europe were highly decentralised, the VOC’s joint stock nature meant power was delegated to the Heren XVII and spilt further into six separate chambers. In Asia however, VOC organisation was highly centralised around the person of the governor-general, moreover unlike the EIC they strictly controlled all activities in their waters. 

The EIC’s structure had a significant amount in common with the VOC, the court of Directors was the English version of the Heren XVII and the EIC had the same joint stock foundation. Though, in Asia the President and his council had a great deal less autonomy than the Board of the Governor General (GG&R). One important consequence of this structure was the building up of specific interest groups within the company whose aims were not always inline with what was best for the company. The structure of the French company to an extent was a combination of the early Portuguese model of trade based around the person of the king and the later Dutch and English model of joint-stock. Coming half a century after the VOC and the EIC, the CDI tried to emulate their success and their organisation. Yet, France did not have a mercantile capitalistic class that were willing to co-operate or even play a serous role in long distance trade to Asia. Therefore, all the initiative had to come from the monarch and his finance minister, which was also where the power laid. Finally, we must keep in mind that the French repeatedly dissolved the company and reorganised it in this period.

The second chapter dealt with the general costs of shipping as well as shipping in general. The Portuguese had the most varied approach to shipping. They built their own ships in Europe, Asia and Brazil, as well as chartering private vessels. Though there are questions surrounding their quality, the ships were by all comparisons produced very cheaply. This might have been helped by the high tonnage of Portuguese vessels, with carracks reaching over 2,000 tons. The choice of the Portuguese, to work along side local Asia political/economic structures allowed them to keep a relatively small and inexpensive bureaucracy in Asia. Though, the Portuguese ships required comparatively heavily manning. The Dutch also bought and used chartered vessels, yet this tended to be in specific times of need, primarily the VOC preferred to control the process in-house: building, chartering and equipping all its vessels itself. This did have the advantage that it was able to control costs to a far greater extent than its rivals, these costs ranged from timber prices to salted meat. The Dutch, like the Portuguese manned their ships heavily, but this may also due to the fact that the Dutch had elaborate bureaucratic systems established in Asia which required a large number of men to operate. This meant that though the Dutch strove to minimise the costs of shipping, they were stilled faced with a large and expensive bureaucracy in Asia.

The English like the VOC experimented with ship building, chartering and hiring, but came to different conclusions. In 1654 they sold their main shipyard in Blackwell and turned to freighting ships from private owners, which included all costs. In terms of men on board and size of vessels, the EIC kept to modest levels. Typically, the English 500 ton vessels were manned by less than 100 persons, the lowest in all our cases. Like all our cases sailors for the EIC only received modest wages. The French policy toward the acquisition of its vessels started very irregular. The French combined buying vessels, building its own and chartering ships. A large number of its generally low quality vessels, being brought in from abroad. In 1730 it made a decisive change in its policy and chose to build all its vessels from a shipyard at the Lorient. From here it stabilised its costs and improved quality. The French followed the example set by the English and tried to keep the size of their vessels low, their tonnage was generally around 500 tons, apart from the in the mid eighteenth century where the average rose to approximately 700 tons. 

From our knowledge about the different approaches to shipping we can make direct head to head comparisons of costs between our cases. This paper is not as simplistic to argue there is a straight forward collation between shipping costs and quantity of trade to and from Asia. The fact that between 1500 and 1800 trade rose substantially in the face of ever increasing costs (on a cost per ton scale), disproves this argument. Yet, the knowledge of the costs involved in shipping has two advantages. Firstly, it gives us an indication of the relative level of funding each of the cases had to raise to take part in long distance trade and secondly, even though it did not determine the level of the success, there is likely to be some correlation between the two. The first aspect of comparison is the difference between freighting and building costs. If the figures are reliable then the costs for Portuguese vessels seem by far the lowest, be it in an earlier period.​[178]​ The next cheapest vessels seem to have belonged to the EIC, then followed by the French and Dutch. Nevertheless, when investigating the costs surrounding ship building the VOC were able to maintain costs at a steady level. This is with the exception of the 1780s where costs nearly doubled; this seems to have had no effect on the VOC’s exports to Asia.​[179]​ The assessment of wage costs brings inconclusive results, as we only have full data on the VOC. The data suggests the level of wage costs fluctuated between f40 and f50 per ton. One might assume that all our cases paid their sailors relatively the same level of pay, yet this is just speculation. However, we do know that the Dutch and Portuguese ships were more heavily manned the English and French, suggesting that they faced higher wage bills. When dealing with the costs of victuals again the comparison is prevented, with data only present for the VOC, which generally showed fairly consistent costs, apart 1790-1795 where costs rose significantly. When we combined all of the aforementioned costs we produced a final set of figures (p. 55-47.) for the total cost per ton of cargo carried from Asia to Europe. Firstly, we notice a gradual increase in costs in this period, this increase is most apparent in the English freight rates. Secondly, the Portuguese rates of costs are significantly lower than the English and the Dutch. This is either because the Portuguese method of shipping was more cost effective or that these lower rates simply reflect the cheaper cost of shipping in this period. Looking closer at the differences between the VOC and EIC, the Dutch company’s costs were consistently lower. The average costs per ton of a VOC ship in this period was f285, whilst for the same voyage the EIC was being charged an average of f344 per ton. From this we can conclude that the Dutch system of shipping was not only more efficient, but it also had the ability to maintain a relative stability in costs.

In terms of funding the Portuguese had the most ad hoc strategy, with no concise plans, but instead reacting from year to year, crisis to crisis. The key aspect being was that it was the crown that was responsible for providing or organising funding. The crown turned heavily to financing through credit, in 1603 bullying 2 million guilders out of Lisbon merchants alone. Lisbon did not have the elaborate credit instruments of Amsterdam or London, which could provide cheap flexible; credit and Portuguese trade did not have the more advanced joint-stock structures of the EIC, VOC and CDI, yet this did not prove to be a restraint. The monarch through the power of his office was able to draw financing to together, effectively bypassing the need of banking systems. Furthermore, not only did the monarch have his private wealth, he could use his sovereign powers to extract capital through extortion or other morally dubious techniques. The centrality of the king, as well as one of the key advantages, also proved to be limiting. For any trading enterprise, the reinvestment of profits was essential, yet the Portuguese monarchs found the temptation to divert profits from trade to other areas of their interest too much.  Nevertheless, if J. Boyajian calculations are correct, then the Portuguese were still able to produce 12 million guilders to invest in Asia from 1580 to 1598, a sizeable amount.​[180]​ Still, this seemed to have been the limit of their working capital and Portugal was not able to increase investment again to expand their trading empire or to compete with their European rivals. 

The VOC was initially financed through the selling of equity, its joint-stock charter allowing for both active and passive members. This created a permanent capital stock of 6.4 million guilders. For temporary short falls of capital the VOC had access through Amsterdam of potentially large quantities of cheap credit and evidence suggests they took advantage of it. However, what was more important was the company’s and the shareholders willingness to reinvest profit, especially in the early years. This is demonstrated in both the absence of dividends until 1610 and the large amounts of specie shipped to Asia, which allowed the VOC to build up a substantial Asian infrastructure. The results in terms of working capital and how much investment these financing methods brought, are interesting. Between, 1601 and 1611 Dutch investment was in the region of 12 million guilders, approximately at the same level as the Portuguese, while being greater than English investment. However, the Dutch were able to continue and expand further, extending their investment to around 25 million guilders of working capital in 1630, this was something the Portuguese system could not do. 

Prior to 1650 the English funding strategy was largely unsuccessful, as evident by the stagnation of their levels of exports.​[181]​ Investment was on a voyage to voyage basis, which hampered long term development or the establishment of any serious form of infrastructure in Asia. With the company reforms in the mid seventeenth century and the establishment of a permanent capital stock all of this was reversed and exports began to slowly increase. In addition to equity, the company turned to credit, such as company fixed interest bonds. The credit available from the London money market was cheap and flexible, characteristics which improved further with the arrival of William III and his Dutch reforms. Like the Dutch company the EIC used retained profits as major source of financing, though it is likely that they were able to reinvest less than the Dutch. The effect of these funding methods and the levels of financing they raised can be seen in our figures of working capital. Prior to company reforms, investment was low, only 4 million guilders from 1601-1611, lower than Dutch and Portuguese levels. The re-charter of 1657 meant the EIC had at least 8 million guilders of permanent capital. The company continued to increase its capital further through subscriptions and reinvestment. Near the end of the period of investigation, 1793 the company’s nominal capital had reached over 66 million guilders.​[182]​ The investment for the EIC seems to have paid off with the company being responsible for exports of over 140,000 tons in the first 5 years of the 1790s.





The introduction of this paper displayed a similar graph of Asian exports, detailed the general trends and suggested that these trends were reliant on a countries/companies capability to meet the financial demands of colonial enterprise. The first unit of analysis was colonial trade conducted by the Portuguese. The early data on the Portuguese shows they had low shipping costs, only 130 guilders per ton in 1600. While their funding techniques were primitive or more generously “traditional”, they did prove relatively successful and the crown maintained a good level of funding in the Asian trade. The financing of trade through a strong monarch of a highly centralised state was an option Portuguese and not many other European countries could boast. This combination of low cost shipping and straight forward financing from a monarch, helps explain the Portuguese’s early leadership in Asia, as demonstrated by their dominance in exports from Asia until 1620. After a brief peak Portuguese exports fell and remained at the nominal level of approximately between 15,000 and 7,000 tons a decade. This paper forwards two reasons for this decline. Firstly, the cost of shipping rose significantly in the sixteenth century, so logically because the Portuguese did not increase the capital made available for trade, they were unable to maintain their previous level of exports. Secondly and more importantly they were faced with new European competitors. These new rivals’ investments soon outmatched the Portuguese, whose more traditional system of funding was not able to step-up a gear. The predominant reason behind this was the king’s powers and willingness to divert profits from the carreira into his other areas of interest and not reinvest in trade. This stagnated level of investment and its effects are displayed perfected in the Portuguese total shipping expenses (materials, wages; victuals) and their export level. In the first decade of the seventeenth century the Portuguese exports had reached 77,190 tons (their peak), while they paid shipping costs of 10,050,781 guilders. By the 1620s the situation had changed, per ton costs had risen from 130 guilders to 226 guilders and the Portuguese faced serious competition in Asia. However, the crown was not willing to increase its investment and the money spent on shipping (materials, wages; victuals) only increased to 10,833,333 guilders. The increased level of investment needed to improve the trading network and for the Portuguese to become competitive was simply unavailable, and as a result the Portuguese exports in the 1620’s fell to 48,000 ton and continued to fall.

The VOC, kept a tight control over their costs, for the seventeenth century they averaged 285 guilders per ton for an East Indiaman, whilst for the same voyage the EIC was being charged an average of 354 guilders per ton. There funding from the start was based upon a permanent capital stock and the directors reinvestment heavily in Asian infrastructures to a far greater extent than any of our other cases. So the VOC combined effective cost management, with efficient and modern funding techniques. The result of this is clear from the above graph of exports, their total supremacy in the arena of trade. Their steadily increasing level of investment produced a steadily increasing level of exports, which eventually evened out at around 280,000 tons per decade. As mentioned the EIC was less successful in controlling its costs, and it is not an overstatement to say they were in their later years held to ransom by the shipping interest and made to pay inflated freight costs. However, deficiency’s in our evidence prevents us from knowing if this was always the case, though it is likely that earlier shipping costs were a great deal lower. Comparing the EIC’s changing financial organisation, with their exports from Asia shows some interesting correlations. Prior to the EIC foundation in 1600 English exports were ranged approximately from 1,000 to 5,000 tons a decade, in the decade of its establishment this shot up to 8,387 and the next decade to 41,681. Financing in this period was received for just individual voyages, lacking the long term aspirations of the Dutch, this again is reflected in the EIC lower export levels. The important change to permanent capital stock in 1657 is reflected in exports. For example, exports increased from 36,450 tons in the 1650s, to 40,950 in the 1660s and then again to 55,055 ton in the 1670s. However after this, exports once again fell, first to 47,879 tons in the 1680s and then 37,561 tons in the 1690s.​[183]​ There was a resurgence in English exports in the eighteenth century; this should be seen as an effect of Williams III financial reforms and record levels of investment by the EIC.

When it comes to estimating French shipping costs, insufficiency of evidence prevents us from producing a cost per ton figure. However it is likely that because of the movement of all shipping building to the Lorient in 1735 that there costs became more competitive. In the 30 years prior to the CDI formation French exports had stagnated at 3,000 tons per decade, the formation brought a fresh equity fuelled capital injection of 12.5 million guilders, exports immediately jumped to 12,000 tons. French funding was adequate if not excellent, which is reflected in there level of exports, which was generally 30,000 tons below the English level. Along with the English, the French company experienced a period (1721-1790) of outstanding growth in exports. This paper cannot conclusively identify the reason behind this trend, just instead suggest a range of possible reasons: the reorganisation and reissuing of shares in 1719 and 1785, the development of the French credit markets and the increasing of potential investors or other possible factors. 
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Table I – Ships and Outbound Tonnage to Asia









































































Source - Vries, “Connecting Europe and Asia”, pp. 46-49.
Table II – Average Tonnage Transported by Ships

































Source - Vries, “Connecting Europe and Asia”, pp. 46-49.


Table III – Freight Rates for EIC (£)
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Table IV – Number of Persons Departing for Asia




































Portugal - 1701-95: 50 men per 100 tons
England - 1761-95: 20 men per 100 tons
France - 1601-1720: 20 men per 100 tons; 1771-95: 20 men per 100 tons
Denmark - 1611-1732: 20 men per 100 tons
Common manning of 20 men per 100 tons probably did not include "passengers" such as military personnel, officials, merchants and craftsmen. This would have been minimal on Danish, Swedish and Ostend vessels, but may have added 33% to English and French vessels. The "passengers" are already included in the Dutch and Portuguese figures.





Table V- Freight Rates of EIC Chinamen



































































































































































Sources - Degryse, “Maritime Aspects of the Ostend Trade”, p. 148,, Bruijn, “Productivity, Profitability”, p. 190., Boyajian, Portuguese Trade, p. 125, Dillo, “Made to Measure?”, pp. 57-66, Davis, “Merchant Shipping”, p. 263.; Chaudhuri, “English East India Company’s Shipping”, p. 75.





1	0.32 pieces of eight
1	0.09 pounds sterling
1	1.2 livres
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